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Abstract
Interactions between an intelligent software agent (ISA) and a human user are ubiq-
uitous in everyday situations such as access to information, entertainment, and pur-
chases. In such interactions, the ISA mediates the user’s access to the content, or 
controls some other aspect of the user experience, and is not designed to be neutral 
about outcomes of user choices. Like human users, ISAs are driven by goals, make 
autonomous decisions, and can learn from experience. Using ideas from bounded 
rationality (and deploying concepts from artificial intelligence, behavioural econom-
ics, control theory, and game theory), we frame these interactions as instances of an 
ISA whose reward depends on actions performed by the user. Such agents benefit 
by steering the user’s behaviour towards outcomes that maximise the ISA’s utility, 
which may or may not be aligned with that of the user. Video games, news rec-
ommendation aggregation engines, and fitness trackers can all be instances of this 
general case. Our analysis facilitates distinguishing various subcases of interaction 
(i.e. deception, coercion, trading, and nudging), as well as second-order effects that 
might include the possibility for adaptive interfaces to induce behavioural addiction, 
and/or change in user belief. We present these types of interaction within a con-
ceptual framework, and review current examples of persuasive technologies and the 
issues that arise from their use. We argue that the nature of the feedback commonly 
used by learning agents to update their models and subsequent decisions could steer 
the behaviour of human users away from what benefits them, and in a direction that 
can undermine autonomy and cause further disparity between actions and goals as 
exemplified by addictive and compulsive behaviour. We discuss some of the ethi-
cal, social and legal implications of this technology and argue that it can sometimes 
exploit and reinforce weaknesses in human beings.
Keywords Artificial intelligence · Machine learning · Human–computer interaction · 
Nudge · Persuasion · Autonomy
 * Christopher Burr 
 chris.burr@bristol.ac.uk
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
 C. Burr et al.
1 3
1 Introduction
The software running various aspects of the world wide web plays an important 
role in shaping human behaviour in the growing list of essential and recreational 
activities migrated online. Engaging in these activities often requires interaction 
with software agents, which mediate between people and the content they seek (e.g. 
news, entertainment, shopping). There exist many types of software agents that peo-
ple now interact with on a daily basis (e.g. recommendation engines for news or 
entertainment, wearable fitness devices, video games), and that are designed to pur-
sue their own goals autonomously, in the sense that they are the locus of a decision-
making process that is designed to pursue some goal.
In this paper we consider various scenarios that arise when a type of software 
agent, which we call an Intelligent Software Agent (ISA), interacts with a human 
user. In doing so, we adapt Russell and Norvig’s (2010) definition of learning 
agents, and define an ISA as any program that can be described as having a model of 
its environment, which it uses to take actions that enable the ISA to achieve its goals, 
while also acquiring further information that it can use to update the parameters of 
its model (see also Cristianini 2010). In the cases we consider, the environment 
of an ISA includes the behaviour of a human user, and the ISA’s goals depend on 
whether the interacting user performs certain actions (e.g. clicks, purchases, actions 
in a game, or physical exercise). Hence, what rewards the ISA obtains is conditional 
on its ability to influence the behaviour of a human user.1
Using language borrowed from control and game theories, we present a simpli-
fied model of autonomous behaviour, based on the classic work on “bounded ration-
ality” (Simon 1956), in order to organise a variety of everyday interactions between 
ISAs and human users into a cohesive framework, which elucidates the differences 
and similarities of the subtypes of interactions. There are three features of all the 
subtypes we consider:
1. The ISA has to choose from a set of available actions that bring about interaction 
with the user. For example, recommending a video or news item; suggesting an 
exercise in a tutoring task; displaying a set of products and prices, and perhaps 
also the context, layout, order and timing with which to present them.
2. The user chooses an action, thereby revealing information about their knowledge 
and preferences to the controlling agent, and determining the utility of the choice 
the ISA made.
3. The cycle repeats resulting in a process of feedback and learning.
1 Cases where there are two agents interacting and attempting to control each other, or to influence a 
third system, are much discussed in game theory (Binmore 2007), economics (Ezrachi and Stucke 2016), 
and artificial intelligence (Russell and Norvig 2010), in terms of the same fundamental ideas.
1 3
An Analysis of the Interaction Between Intelligent Software…
Although we focus on a single special case (i.e. interaction between an ISA and 
human user), our discussion also applies more generally, especially to other cases of 
control and interaction.2
The type of interaction at question is behind the revenue model of many com-
panies, and is highly complex since the environments of ISA’s are human minds, 
which depend on culture. Extensive research and development has generated 
increasingly effective systems that learn from experience. A typical ISA, such as a 
recommender system, might have to select a set of videos for a user to watch (out 
of a vast catalogue), using any available information or signal it has about the given 
user (e.g. location, time, past usage, explicit ratings, and much more). In this case, 
the ISA’s goal is to select an action that, for the given user, maximises the expected 
click-through rate (CTR): an expression of the probability of users clicking through 
links. The user, on the other hand, has the option of clicking on one of those videos, 
or opting out, and their utility function might be related to some entertainment or 
information need.
There are much more complex utility functions and decision procedures than this. 
For example, the many ISAs behind Google’s advertising network select advertise-
ments, out of catalogues of millions, to show on web pages (O’Reilly 2015). A par-
ticular advertisement is selected by an ISA autonomously running an auction that 
determines which advertiser is willing to pay the most for their advertisement to be 
shown on this occasion. This list of possible bids is simultaneously weighted against 
a single “quality score”, which is obtained by estimating the probability that a given 
user (described by thousands of possible signals) would click on each of the possible 
advertisements, and combining it with the potential price of each possible click—
this can be idealised as the ISA computing an expected utility. The “quality score” 
is used to rank the various options (advertisements) and determine the optimal deci-
sion—in this instance, a combination of the revenue associated with each advertise-
ment, and the respective probability of click-through. All of this must happen within 
the milliseconds it takes for a web page to load (Google 2017). Another example 
is the score assigned to drivers and passengers in a ride-sharing app, acting as a 
proxy for the quality of service each party can expect from the other (e.g. cleanliness 
of car, friendliness of individual), and used to automatically match passenger with 
driver.
Machine learning has been used for years in these contexts, in which people inter-
act with ISAs often without realising it, with significant success. However, there is 
confusion about how to think about these interactions. Our primary aim is to use a 
review of what is currently possible with persuasive technologies to develop a clear 
framework for thinking about the many ethical, legal, political, psychological and 
social issues that arise as a result of continued human interaction with ISAs. We 
do not presuppose or argue for claims about the right context, degree and extent 
of ISA use, but our framework facilitates discussion of the challenges that have 
emerged, and will arise from future technological innovation. According to Floridi 
2 A number of deeper analyses are available on different topics (e.g. Cairns and Cox 2008; Dourish 
2004), and may be necessary to answer different questions about human–computer interactions.
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and Sanders’ (2004) definition of a moral agent, ISAs are moral agents (Sect. 5.3). 
Our discussion is neutral about this, though not about whether ISA’s are agents in 
the sense of making decisions in accordance with preferences based on a represen-
tation of the environment (as in the definition above and detailed in the next sec-
tion). As such their actions and their effects on human beings are certainly morally 
significant.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of an 
‘autonomous agent’, some relevant terminology, and a simplified model inspired by 
key concepts from bounded rationality. Section 3 adds the requirement that the ISA’s 
reward depends on the actions taken by the human user (as in 2 above), deducing 
from the resulting framework a simple taxonomy of the different ways in which the 
ISA can influence its human user. Section 4 uses this framework to review various 
situations that can be described in terms of persuasive interactions and introduces a 
number of questions about second-order effects, such as belief change and behav-
ioural addiction, which may arise from unintended feedback loops. Section 5 out-
lines a series of ethical implications, discussing how recent proposals fit within our 
framework, and concludes.
2  Autonomous Agents and Bounded Rationality
We begin by describing the concept of an autonomous agent, tasked with choos-
ing some action that depends on the state of its environment (which could include 
another agent), before showing how this general description applies to the ISA-
human user interactions. The description is an idealisation, and as such does not 
consider details of the physical implementation of the agents in question (e.g. 
whether they are biological, social, software, hardware, or even a mixture).
The need to describe or model the choice behaviour of an autonomous agent 
arises in many domains. The simplest models assume an agent trying to pick the 
best action in a given state, where “best” refers to whatever maximises expected util-
ity or reward.3 The agent can (partially) observe the current state of the environ-
ment, compute the probability for each of the possible outcomes of each action, and 
then evaluate each outcome on the basis of its expected utility. However, real agents 
do not necessarily know all the logical consequences of all their actions; they must 
compute them (and their probability) within various constraints (e.g. computational 
tractability). As such, the standard concept of an autonomous agent incorporates 
the notion of `bounded rationality’ (Simon 1956), but still remains highly idealised 
(Gigerenzer and Selten 2002). We also adopt the perspective of bounded rational-
ity, as it allows us to establish some terminology and distinguish between different 
types of cases that are otherwise easily confused. For the purposes of our analysis 
and discussion (Sects. 4 and 5), and to help draw attention to specific features of our 
3 For simplicity, we treat ‘utility’, ‘reward’, and ‘value’ as interchangeable, given the wide range of dis-
ciplines we address, while noting that they have different technical definitions in certain disciplines (e.g. 
reinforcement learning).
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conceptual framework, we present a simplified (and idealised) model of a bounded 
agent interacting with its environment, where the ‘environment’ is restricted to the 
perceived actions of another interacting agent (see Russell and Norvig 2010, for fur-
ther discussion on these concepts). This level of abstraction allows us to focus on 
specific behaviours of the interacting agents and their environment, while screening 
off irrelevant details. For example, we do not consider questions such as whether the 
probabilistic model of the environment is the same for both agents, and we ignore 
details such as whether the interaction is mediated by a device such as a smartphone 
or computer screen. Although these details may have important consequences wor-
thy of exploration, in this paper we aim for a more general level of analysis.
Consider an agent that must choose an action from a set of possible actions 
(a∈ A),4 while its environment is in a particular state  (si ∈ S). The outcome of this 
action is a change in the state of its environment  (sj ∈ S), which may not depend 
entirely on the agent’s actions. Agents assign numerical values to outcomes (U: 
AxS → ℝ), to indicate the expected utility associated with them, and the goal of the 
agent is to choose the action that will maximise its overall subjective utility (hereaf-
ter, utility). The agent knows the utility for each outcome, given by U(a,  sj), and has 
a probabilistic model of the possible consequences of its action, given by P(sj | a, 
 si): the conditional probability that by performing action a in state  si, the state of its 
environment will change to  sj. Typically, this is solved by calculating the expected 
utility of taking some action a in the current state  (si ∈ S), then averaging over all 
possible outcomes  (sj ∈ S):
and repeating this for each possible action (a∈ A), before selecting the action with 
the maximum expected utility:
This simple model separates the beliefs of the agent (i.e. its probabilistic model 
of its environment) from its goals (i.e. the utility function), as well as allowing us 
to combine them into a single function that can be used to represent its preferences.
Importantly, the model involves steps where computational and other resources 
are needed (e.g. calculation of expected utility), and this serves to differentiate ways 
in which agents deviate from “rational” behaviour. The most common cases involve 
limitations concerning information about S, the computational cost of maximisa-
tion, constraints upon memory, and knowing (or accessing) all possible actions in 
A (leading to various models of bounded rationality, e.g. Simon 1956; Rubinstein 
1998; Gigerenzer and Selten 2002, which adapt the above definition in different 
EU
(
a, si
)
=
n∑
j=1
P(sj|a, si)U
(
a, sj
)
a∗ = argmax
a∈A
EU
(
A, si
)
4 It is assumed that there are at least two actions available, otherwise there is no decision and so no need 
for a model of the decision problem.
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ways). These limitations apply to both artificial agents and human users, and both 
use heuristics—of very different kinds—to bypass enumeration of all possible out-
comes and exhaustive deliberation. Heuristics are often approximations that only 
work in a specific, and narrowly defined environment, limiting their use. As dis-
cussed in Sect. 4.3, by knowing the biases and heuristics used by an agent, it is pos-
sible to steer their behaviour away from a more rational outcome.
The special case we consider is when part of the environment is another agent 
who is guided by a distinct utility function.5 The controlling agent attempts to 
steer the behaviour of controlled agent, typically towards states that maximise the 
expected utility of the controlling agent. If the utility function of the controlling 
agent is aligned with that of the controlled agent, the interaction is one of coop-
eration; to the degree that they are not, there is an element of competition (e.g. in 
games such as Chess or Go, and a wide variety of other cases where two agents pur-
sue incompatible goals while interacting). This control problem is in general proba-
bilistic because there is no guarantee that the attempted control will be successful in 
bringing about the desired outcome. The controlling agent bets on the outcome of its 
actions, because it can only probabilistically predict the reward they will generate.
We consider the case where the controlling agent is an ISA and the controlled 
agent is a human user. Some ways for an artificial agent to control the actions of 
a human user include: to offer incentives to perform a given action (e.g. a recom-
mender system presenting a highly rewarding news item or video to a user); to 
exploit some heuristic shortcuts of the user (e.g. a recommender system using social 
pressure to encourage the user to share a news item); to deceive (e.g. a recommender 
system resorting to clickbait to increase its utility without the user benefiting); and/
or to coerce (e.g. a recommender system requiring an advertisement to be watched 
as a prerequisite for use). We can describe all of these sub-cases, using the simpli-
fied model presented in this section, applied to both an ISA and a human user, and 
also separate them according to how they operate by considering different compo-
nents of the model (Sect. 3).
Various disciplines have focused on different aspects of the general prob-
lem above. For example, in classical control theory, the controller can observe 
the state of the controlled system, and knows the actions it can take, in addition 
to their effect on the state of the controlled system. Here, the control problem is 
to select the most rewarding action for the controlling agent, where the reward is 
defined in terms of the state of the controlled system (see Sutton and Barto 1998). 
In economics and decision theory, a rational agent can observe its own state and 
5 It should be noted prior to discussion of related ethical issues, that we intend our usage of the term 
‘utility’ to be neutral with regards to the adoption of any particular ethical theory (e.g. preference utilitar-
ianism (Singer 2011), or classical (hedonistic) utilitarianism, such as that defended by Jeremy Bentham 
(see Bykvist 2010 for a simple introduction)). We employ it here in line with its usage in standard deci-
sion theory (e.g. the axiomatic approach of von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). This is a recurring 
theme throughout the paper, as in general we do not commit to any particular ethical theory (e.g. utilitari-
anism, virtue ethics). However, at relevant points, we do note standard texts that explore certain topics in 
more detail, and also suggest Zevenbergen et al. (2015) and Floridi (2010) for discussions of the relation 
between intelligent system design, information technology, and moral philosophy.
1 3
An Analysis of the Interaction Between Intelligent Software…
that of its environment, and has a probabilistic model of the effect of its actions 
on the state of the environment (see Binmore 2009). Knowing also the utility of 
each state of the environment, the rational agent’s goal is to select the action with 
the highest expected utility. Behavioural economics assumes that an agent’s ration-
ality is bounded, and emphasises an agent’s use of heuristics: shortcuts that can 
approximate good decisions in typical settings, but may lead to irrational behaviour 
in non-typical domains (Kahneman 2011). Finally, in Artificial Intelligence (AI) the 
artificial agent needs to learn the effect of its own action, and their utility, while at 
the same time trying to control its own environment (see Russell and Norvig 2010). 
Modern AI agents often use an architecture that does not enumerate all outcomes 
of all actions, but rely on model-free algorithms (e.g. Q-learning) to estimate the 
expected reward of an action, without exploring all possibilities—this is equivalent 
to using heuristics. Similarly, when modeling an artificial agent, it is often sufficient 
to estimate their utility function, without distinguishing between goals and beliefs.6
Most AI agents learn their heuristics from interactions with their environment, 
and these heuristic functions can be iteratively tuned by using machine learning 
algorithms (e.g. reinforcement learning techniques such as bandit algorithms), in 
combination with large amounts of training examples (Sutton and Barto 1998).7 
This is the case for many of today’s AI (and learning agents more generally), which 
constantly refine their heuristics, learning to predict the expected reward of their 
actions by constantly looking at their outcomes.
There are many different processes that can be used in practice to design an arti-
ficial agent. While its utility function is selected by the designer and kept fixed, its 
beliefs (model of the environment) can either be directly designed, fine-tuned by 
experimentation [e.g. A/B testing: a standard technique similar to running a clini-
cal trial on a sample of users, which was famously used by Google to determine 
which of a possible 41-shades of blue to use for their web links (Arthur 2012)], or 
directly learned by machine learning methods [e.g. by reinforcement learning proce-
dures, which allow an actively deployed artificial agent to improve constantly, while 
tracking drifting environments (Sutton and Barto 1998)]. In all these cases, it is pos-
sible that the design process stumbles upon a highly effective heuristic, and then 
exploits it, or improves on it through further exploration. Except perhaps for the case 
of explicit design, there is no reason to expect an artificial agent to actually com-
pute the outcomes of each possible action and their reward—effective behaviour can 
often result from simple rules of thumb or heuristics. This might also make it dif-
ficult to interpret by humans (Burrell 2016), and has additional implications for our 
discussion in Sect. 5. As mentioned above, on the Floridi and Sanders (2004) defi-
nition, the class of moral agents extends to the kinds of artificial agents considered 
6 See (Russell and Norvig 2010) for an introduction to the different types of modern artificial agents that 
are commonly deployed.
7 Bandit algorithms are commonly used in optimisation problems, such as website design, where an 
agent is unsure which of n possible options maximises some value (e.g. purchases). A bandit algorithm 
aims to optimise the inherent trade-off between exploring new options (e.g. new design improvements to 
a website), while exploiting known strategies. They take their name from the multi-armed bandit prob-
lem in probability theory (see White 2013).
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in this paper. Section  5.3, briefly presents their proposal which allows that moral 
agents may nevertheless be “mind-less”, in the sense of not necessarily exhibiting 
mental states (e.g. emotions) or responsibility (i.e. ‘mind-less morality’). This paper 
shows that whether or not ISAs are properly considered to be moral agents, their 
integration with human action raises moral challenges.
3  Intelligent Software Agents and Human Users
In this section, we consider the special case of interaction between ISAs and human 
users in more detail. An ISA is usually deployed for the purpose of maximising a 
given utility function that reflects the goals of whoever developed it, for example, to 
increase the revenue of a company or spread a political message. The ISA chooses 
from a set of actions whose outcomes partially depend on the choices made by 
the human user. This means that depending on the relation between the two utility 
functions, the ISA might effectively be collaborating or competing with its human 
user—an observation related to the value alignment problem8 (Sect. 5.1). There are 
various ways in which the ISA can increase its utility by inducing the user to per-
form certain actions (e.g. reading or sharing an article). In particular, the actions of 
the ISA (e.g. selecting an article) are divided into three subtypes: coercion, decep-
tion and persuasion. This section introduces our framework, and briefly introduces 
each of the three subtypes. Section 4 explores some of them in much more detail.
To simplify the discussion, we focus on the running example of recommender 
systems, such as those commonly used for news and videos, but also in the context 
of video games, fitness devices, and various other interfaces. A recommender sys-
tem (RS) is a type of interface that mediates the interactions of an ISA and a human 
user and is largely (if not entirely) under the control of the ISA. In these interac-
tions, we assume that the user has a particular need (e.g. a specific type of informa-
tion or entertainment), and the ISA responsible for selecting the recommendations 
has the goal of increasing some form of engagement (e.g. clicks, shares, likes, etc.). 
The user’s engagement is interpreted as signalling the relevance of the recommenda-
tions, and is therefore considered a rewarding (and informative) state by the ISA. We 
use ‘click through rate’ (CTR) as a running example of a measure of reward used by 
the ISA, but any other measure of ‘success’ could be used. In this example, the ISA 
can recommend a selection of relevant items from a large catalogue, along with sup-
porting meta-information (e.g. images, descriptions, ranks, etc.), which are designed 
to help the user make a decision. The user also retains the choice to leave at any 
given time, which would not normally be in the interest of the ISA.9 The popularity 
of RSs is largely due to their ability both to increase the utility of boundedly rational 
8 In brief, the value alignment problem is the problem of how AI designer’s can ensure that autonomous 
decision-making systems maximise a reward function that is aligned with human values (see Bostrom 
2016).
9 A search engine RS is an exception, where a measure of relevance is precisely that the user has found 
the desired link and left, and a user that does not leave is a sign of uninformative options (O’Reilly 
2017). RSs in social networks do not seem to aim for short interactions.
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users—who would otherwise be unable to examine each item in the catalogue on 
their own—and also maximise the ISA’s utility. Importantly, one can describe the 
goal of the ISA as either ‘maximising the relevance for the user’, or as ‘maximising 
the CTR’. These two quantities are often conflated in the technical literature, but 
they are not necessarily aligned. As discussed in Sect. 5, there is an important dis-
tinction between short-term and long-term benefits for the human user, and a hidden 
cost of using proxies for utility.
3.1  Coercion and Deception
We briefly consider below coercion and deception which are viable and popular 
methods to control the behaviour of a user. Coercion involves denying access to or 
imposing conditions on certain actions (a∈ A), whereas deception affects the way 
in which the user assesses the utility associated with some state of the world, or the 
payoff of the choice (i.e. they still act rationally, but on false premises).
3.1.1  Coercion
A familiar, mild form of coercion is when the user is in need of information and so 
accesses a RS, but cannot skip a promotional video. Since they have no choice (i.e. 
their set of actions have been restricted), and were not looking for that video, they 
have been coerced to see it. This situation is also commonly found in a variant form: 
when other actions are requested as a prerequisite to gaining access to some service 
(e.g. sharing personal data in order to gain access).
In some cases, it may be not be straightforward to determine whether some action 
constitutes coercion. Consider a recent case in Germany, in which an antitrust law-
suit targeting Facebook raised questions as to whether the social media company 
used its popularity to coerce users into agreeing to their terms and conditions gov-
erning personal data collection. As part of this investigation, EU antitrust regula-
tors considered whether the practice of using the fear of social isolation constitutes 
a form of extortion, or whether it is merely part of the terms of use for the social 
media platform, which users are free to reject (White and Matussek 2017).
3.1.2  Deception
As a particular type of deception, consider the case of clickbait, or an ISA that 
selects links with misleading descriptions. Clickbait and phishing scams are a form 
of deceiving recommendations, which misrepresent their real contents, sometimes 
requiring several additional links before that is discovered. The user will click on 
them, thereby increasing the utility of the ISA (e.g. increased CTR), but have them-
selves been mislead, and their own utility has not been increased (e.g. they do not in 
fact obtain relevant information). Other forms of deception might include unwanted 
pop-ups warning of a virus threat; advertisements that offer a software package for 
 C. Burr et al.
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one purpose, only to deliver something else (e.g. malware); or harmful attachments 
to emails.
3.2  Persuasion
In cases of persuasion, the general setting is probabilistic. The ISA controls which 
options are presented, based on its probabilistic beliefs about the actions taken by the 
user (or group of users) in response, as well as its own goals. In line with the usage 
in persuasive technology (Fogg 2003), we define `persuasion’ as any case where the 
ISA is influencing the user’s actions without using deception or coercion. We intro-
duce and distinguish two important cases of persuasion: trading and nudging.
3.2.1  Trading
Trading occurs when the ISA has some knowledge of the user’s goals (either 
revealed by their actions, or explicitly stated by the user), and presents the user with 
options that are expected to increase both the user’s utility and the ISA’s utility—
both sides benefit from the trade. The ISA models the user’s utility, but it does not 
adopt that model as its own. The ISA’s goal is to maximise its own utility, and the 
increase in the user’s utility is a means to that end. For example, the goal of a news 
site may be to increase its traffic, and so it will offer articles that are most valuable 
to the user and most likely to be clicked on. But it is also possible to consider cases 
where the goal of the ISA is to make a profit, while also finding a good deal for the 
user, and so this would imply more complex trade-offs (e.g. Google’s advertising 
system). Trading can also involve altering the payoff structure of the choice through 
financial incentives (e.g. offering a discount to persuade the user to purchase an 
item), as is done in dynamic pricing (Ezrachi and Stucke 2016). Often, the main 
benefit for the user is to be able to efficiently search large sets of options at a low 
cost, in this way making a more rational choice.
In Sect. 4.2 we describe in more detail some specific cases of real-world trading 
by ISAs. We discuss how ISAs segment users into various groups, as a prerequisite 
for modelling a user’s utility, and how this enables trading to be carried out between 
user and ISA.
3.2.2  Nudging
Nudging is when the ISA seeks to influence the human user’s decision by targeting 
the user’s biases and heuristics. Unlike trading, nudging does not change the finan-
cial incentives for the user, and may or may not increase the user’s utility (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008). When the user’s biases are predictable, as many are (Ariely 2008), 
they can be exploited by nudges that steer a user towards actions that they may not 
rationally choose otherwise and might even be of detriment of the user. For example, 
in the familiar case of recommendation, an ISA might try to induce users to click on 
an item that is sub-optimal for the user, but preferred by the ISA, by using emotional 
1 3
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associations, social effects, or other methods to bias their choices. This would not 
constitute deception, because the ISA is not misrepresenting the options.
It is important to note that a user can act rationally while still decreasing its own 
utility (e.g. if they operate under false beliefs or incomplete information). In this 
case, a nudging agent might steer the user towards better options, as is the case 
for some type of fitness devices or health interventions. Section 4.3 discusses how 
nudging can play a positive role when users have conflicting sets of internal goals, 
and may even be used to promote a user’s autonomy. When used against the interest 
of the user, however, nudging can reduce their autonomy and utility and this needs 
to be considered by regulators.
3.3  Second‑Order Effects
Second-order effects might arise unintentionally when the user’s beliefs or utility 
function are modified as a result of long-term interaction with an ISA. Rather than 
focusing on the ways in which the ISA can affect individual actions in the short-
term, as described in the previous sections, we consider more permanent changes in 
the user resulting from the prolonged interaction with the ISA. These second-order 
effects can arise because human users are also learning systems, constantly revis-
ing their models, beliefs and expectations through trial and error (e.g. reinforcement 
learning). The learning dynamics of the cases we consider, may include positive 
feedback loops, which could amplify some of the smaller effects over longer periods 
of time (Sutton and Barto 1998).
Section 4.4 considers how repeated exposure to certain types of content can result 
in changes to a user’s belief system (e.g. their assessment of what the mainstream 
consensus is on a given topic; Sect. 4.4.1). Repeated exposure to a rewarding stimu-
lus may generate behavioural addiction in human users, and result in a change to 
their utility function (Sect. 4.4.2). Therefore, while pursuing some short-term goal, 
an ISA might end up changing not only the user’s immediate actions (e.g. whether to 
share a news article or watch a video) but also long-term attitudes and beliefs, sim-
ply by controlling the exposure of a user to certain types of content.
The types of interaction between an ISA and a human user introduced in this sec-
tion can be accommodated within the taxonomy outlined in Box 1. Section 4 reviews 
various techniques used in persuasive technologies, informed by this taxonomy.
4  Persuasion of Human Users by Intelligent Software Agents
This review of persuasion is informed by work being done under different labels 
within different communities, such as persuasive technology (Fogg 2003; de Vries 
et al. 2017); persuasion profiling (Kaptein et al. 2015); gamification (Deterding et al. 
2011); habit-formation (Eyal 2014); and influence (Cialdini 2009). This section 
reviews some of the methods currently used by ISAs to persuade users guided by the 
taxonomy outlined in Sect. 3.
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4.1  Feedback
It is important for an ISA to have information about the goals or needs of the user. 
While it is possible to ask them (e.g. to rate or review various products), it is often 
more economical to just observe their behaviour and collect information about what 
they end up clicking on. In online interactions, a user’s actions are monitored by the 
ISA as a process of ongoing feedback. In general, feedback is a signal going from 
the controlled system (e.g. human user) to the controller (e.g. ISA), which can ena-
ble the controller to determine and learn from the consequences of its actions (i.e. 
revising how the controlling agent classifies some behaviour). In the case of learning 
agents, the feedback plays another role: they can use it to adapt their models of the 
user, so as to behave more effectively. For example, in a recommender system (RS) 
for video content, the ISA proposes a few options to the user, then the user makes a 
choice, providing feedback to the controlling agent in the form of new information 
Box 1  A summary of the taxonomy developed in the paper, and the types of interactions that can take 
place between an ISA and a human user. The interactions are structured by how the components of the 
Maximum Expected Utility formula are involved in the control process
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about the world, as well as the reward (if any) that has been received.10 The process 
of a controlling agent acting on the environment, and the environment feeding back 
some information about its new state, causing the controller to consider a new set 
of actions, is described by classical control theory, and is also known as a feedback 
loop.
Feedback loops are processes commonly found in biological and sociological 
systems, as well as other physical systems. Positive feedback loops are processes in 
which a change in one part of the system increases the magnitude of another part, 
which in turn intensifies the original cause (i.e. a change in A increases B, which in 
turn increases A). Positive feedback amplifies causal loops, which in extreme cases 
can push the system far from a stable equilibrium due to self-reinforcing dynam-
ics (e.g. live audio feedback). For example, watching a recommended video may 
increase the need to watch another video (e.g. through advertisements, sugges-
tions and preloading techniques), and users may end up watching more videos than 
intended due to unexpected levels of reward. In contrast, a negative feedback loop 
is a process in which a change in one part of a system acts on another part of the 
system so as to return the variable of the initial part to its original state, thereby 
maintaining the equilibrium of the system. For example, when a search engine cor-
rectly answers the query of a user, thereby satisfying the user’s information need and 
closing the interaction. This topic is discussed further in Sects. 4.4 and 5.
A recent article (Kramer et al. 2014) created some controversy when it reported 
that the emotional state of Facebook users could be estimated from their choice of 
words, and that this could be influenced by selectively exposing those users to dif-
ferent kinds of content. While this was done only in one iteration, and not for a sus-
tained time, positive feedback loops might amplify the emotion of the most suscep-
tible users.
Typically, what the ISA considers as feedback is not generated explicitly by 
the user (e.g. rating recommendations), and so ISAs often make use of implicit 
feedback instead by evaluating behavioural signals in the user’s interactions (e.g. 
interpreting a click as an indirect sign of approval, or relevance). These “digital 
traces” allow the ISA to update its model about what the user enjoys watching—
in the context of information retrieval (as for news or videos searches) this is 
called “relevance feedback” (Baeza-Yates and Ribeiro-Neto 2010).
Users might be unaware that some of their actions can be interpreted as indica-
tions of the content’s relevance (e.g. likes, shares, clicks). A recent study (McDuff 
et al. 2013) demonstrated that a user’s facial responses to media could be used to 
automatically determine whether they “liked” the media, or had a “desire to view 
again”, potentially allowing ISAs to quantify the effectiveness of their actions 
(e.g. selecting advertisements or other media) by gathering implicit feedback. It 
is now possible to infer ‘private’ information about the user (Kosinski et al. 2013; 
Matz et  al. 2017) from their online actions, since some of them (e.g. “likes”) 
10 Relevance feedback can also be used to compute a “relevance score”, which orders each possible item 
in a RS according to its expected utility (e.g. ranking news items displayed on Facebook’s Newsfeed), 
and is a common technique used in RSs (Ricci et al. 2011).
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correlate strongly with personal traits including: sexual orientation, ethnicity, and 
political views (e.g. Kosinski et al. 2013), and this raises a number of ethical con-
cerns (see discussion in Sect. 5).
By using CTR as a proxy for relevance feedback, it becomes possible for the 
agent to learn what makes the user click, without disturbing the user with ques-
tions. However, as a result the ISA will not know why the corresponding item 
was considered rewarding to the user; all it will know is that it was considered 
rewarding enough to click. As such, it is not clear that the ISA is able to learn the 
“real” wants and needs of a user, as opposed to simply what makes them click. 
This could make the value alignment of an ISA and user’s goals increasingly dif-
ficult. The problem is exacerbated in cases of nudging, where it might become 
possible that the ISA ends up exploiting psychological vulnerabilities, rather than 
proposing trades that are actually beneficial for both parties. Related concerns 
have been raised by some technology designers (Lewis 2017), and will be further 
discussed in Sect. 5.
4.2  Trading
The idea behind trading is that the ISA has some knowledge of the utility function 
of the user, possibly because the user has declared it explicitly (e.g. a hotel booking 
website might ask the user to specify if they are more interested in location or price), 
the ISA has inferred it by observation (e.g. a RS used by a social media platform 
will try to infer the interests of the user based on their online choice of news), or the 
designers have hardwired their assumptions about it into the ISA (e.g. a price com-
parison site might assume that the user will prefer the cheapest options). A mix of 
the above is also often used.
Consider the RSs used by social networks, news and entertainment websites, and 
online shops. With knowledge of the user’s utility, an ISA will be able to trade by 
offering a deal to the user: relevant and useful information in return for clicks, or 
other forms of compensation, such as purchases (e.g. a video recommendation site 
offering both free and paid-for videos). Here, deception and coercion are not used, 
and the user benefits from the help offered by the ISA in locating valuable content. 
In trading, both the user and the ISA may increase their utility, and so they are not 
necessarily in competition with one another. However, tensions may arise if the ISA 
needs to select between a free video and one that requires payment, while calcu-
lating the expected revenue that might result from different advertisements associ-
ated with different videos. In this case, the utility functions of user and ISA may not 
align, and this is typical in offline instances of trading as well. An ISA may be able 
to exploit the informational asymmetry inherent in non-transparent markets due to 
large-scale (and real-time) data collection, in order to alter the cost associated with 
the recommended items (see Ezrachi and Stucke 2016). In some special cases the 
price can also be adapted to a particular user in real-time (i.e. dynamic pricing).11
11 The use of dynamic pricing is becoming increasingly widespread, and has been identified in the fol-
lowing areas (among others): taxi hire (Newcomer 2017); insurance (Admiral Group 2017); e-commerce 
(Baird 2017); and education services (Angwin and Larson 2015). Its continued adoption has also raised a 
number of economic concerns (Ezrachi and Stucke 2016).
1 3
An Analysis of the Interaction Between Intelligent Software…
This familiar situation fits within the simplified model introduced in Sect. 2: the 
user has a goal (e.g. consuming entertainment or information); the ISA has a goal 
(e.g. maximising CTR); the user has a set of actions to choose from (e.g. engage 
with certain items, or leave site); the ISA has a set of actions to choose from (e.g. 
select items, order items, present items in a particular manner); their respective 
beliefs (e.g. the ISA’s model of the user’s own utility) influence which actions they 
each take; and both can use feedback to update their models of the world (e.g. the 
user may notice newer (more relevant) recommendations, as a result of an earlier 
purchase).
In such instances, the key benefit of trading with an ISA is that the system can 
help users remove the worst options from the list, and focus their resources to a nar-
rower set of promising options. This may greatly benefit a boundedly rational user 
by helping ensure they act in accordance with their goals. This is the intended role 
of RSs found in news aggregators, social networks, online music shops, video web-
sites (see Jannach et al. 2010; Ricci et al. 2011 for introductions).
In cases of trading, RSs often help users to save computational resources: the 
ISA typically recommends a ranked list of items, from which the user is expected 
to choose in order to maximise their utility. On the other hand, the close observa-
tion of large numbers of users provides ISAs with the tools to predict users’ future 
behaviour. Although large companies with significant traffic might create individual 
models for their users,12 a typical strategy for RSs is to identify types of users that 
are similar in some regard, and then recommend them similar items. This requires 
the ISA to segment users according to the relevant similarities. For example, an ISA 
could use traditional demographic segmentation to carve up a population (e.g. age, 
gender, income, job, or location), such that the segments are sufficiently homoge-
neous to enable recommendations that can benefit both the user and the ISA (e.g. 
an advertisement that is targeted at a particular age group, in a certain geographic 
location, which is correlated with high income). Alternatively, an ISA could use 
behavioural segmentation to group users based on similar behaviours (e.g. targeting 
people who bought a certain product, visited a certain website, or liked a particu-
lar post). Finally, the ISA could use psychometric segmentation, which groups users 
according to psychological traits (e.g. personality traits, or emotional state).13
Each of the above methods of segmentation allow RSs to employ a technique 
known as “collaborative filtering” (Ricci et al. 2011). This utilises the information 
analysable from segments of users to enable the RS to predict the future patterns of 
similar users. The benefit of collaborative-filtering techniques is that the RS does 
not need to ‘know’ anything about the content of the items—it is sufficient that 
some users prefer some items to others. Various algorithms can be created to parti-
tion the set of users and the set of items, creating classes of users that like the same 
12 In some cases this has even been proposed as means for increasing the persuasive abilities of ISAs 
(Kaptein et al. 2015), by developing individual “persuasion profiles” for users.
13 Since this information is typically obtained (or inferred) based on samples of behaviour, the question 
of whether it simply represents another form of behavioural segmentation is debatable.
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type of items, and classes of items that are liked by the same type of users (e.g. 
neighbourhood-based algorithms).
Another way to make recommendations is to segment the list of items (e.g. differ-
ent genres of books, similar music), and then recommend an individual user (or seg-
mentation of users) ‘more of the same’. This is known as “content-based filtering”, 
as it requires segmenting the list of items based on the similarity of their content. 
The RS then selects items based on a comparison between the content of the items 
and some knowledge of the user’s (or segmentation of users) relevant preferences. 
The content of each item is represented as a set of descriptors or terms (e.g. the set 
of words that appear in a text, genre of music). Until recently content-based methods 
were costly for most datasets except text. However, with the rise of Deep Learning 
methods (e.g. Kingma et  al. 2014; LeCun et  al. 2015) it is now possible to make 
content-based recommendations of songs, images, videos, and more.14
It is also worth noting that similar methods can be used to mediate between mul-
tiple users of a platform (e.g. ride-sharing or room-sharing services), rather than 
between user and content. In these cases, users are ranked on the basis of aggregate 
feedback from the community (e.g. star ratings), such that a driver or host may be 
motivated to improve the level of service they offer, in order to maximise the prob-
ability that they receive a positive rating. This can help regulate the system without 
the need for top-down intervention (O’Reilly 2013), and can be viewed as a form of 
trading between the two user’s, which is mediated by an ISA.
Each of the above techniques allows ISAs potentially to recommend the best 
options available to the user (or users), while simultaneously increasing their own 
utility (including increased learning about the user’s goals). So long as the ISA can 
be carefully designed to exactly maximise a user’s utility, its recommendations can 
benefit the user. However, any misalignment between a user’s utility and that of the 
ISA represents a possible source of tensions and conflicts of interest as discussed 
further in Sect. 5.
4.3  Nudging
Nudging occurs when an ISA attempts to induce user engagement without signifi-
cantly altering the payoff structure of the options, and without coercion and decep-
tion (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Nudging is successful because humans are lim-
ited in the resources they can devote to decision-making (e.g. time, information, 
and computational resources), and like artificial agents,15 human agents use heuris-
tics to quickly select a few salient options when making decisions (Simon 1956; 
14 The annual conference RecSys, which is dedicated to state-of-the-art research in recommender sys-
tems, routinely hosts workshops on applying deep learning methods to RSs (e.g. https ://recsy s.acm.org/
recsy s17/dlrs/).
15 Algorithms also make use of shortcuts, and machine learning algorithms might discover the best 
shortcuts from experience. These might map action-state pairs to expected rewards, without explicitly 
enumerating and evaluating all possible outcomes—these maps can be very accurate if based on detailed 
descriptions of the state of the world, and extensive training data.
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Gigerenzer et al. 1999). However, heuristics are often domain-specific, and may lead 
to irrational choices if used in more general domains. In the behavioural sciences, 
they are often attributed to the first of two separate systems that we use for judgment 
and decision-making: one that relies on habits, associations, and emotions to make 
fast decisions on the basis of limited information, and another for slower more delib-
erative decisions (Kahneman 2011).
Knowledge of how these predictable heuristics work (see Ariely 2008 for exam-
ples), allows others to exploit them, by influencing what is known as a ‘choice 
architecture’—a concept made famous by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in 
their (2008) book ‘Nudge’. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) explore the various ways in 
which the choice behaviour of individuals can be affected by intervening on (i.e. 
“nudging”) how the various options are presented (i.e. the choice architecture).16 For 
example, altering the order or layout of choices alters an individual’s preferences 
(e.g. framing and primacy bias); deploying certain design features can increase the 
probability of some options being noticed and selected (e.g. availability); and alter-
ing the concepts associated with the presentation of a choice, can prime individuals 
to prefer certain options (e.g. priming or representativeness) (see Kahneman 2011).
Because of the popularity of this concept, there now exists a large number of 
nudges, which have been subjected to empirical study. Sunstein (2016, pp. 26, 27) 
provides a list of some of the most popular, which includes: defaults (e.g. having 
some option pre-selected, such that no intervention by the user still results in a 
choice); simplification (e.g. ensuring forms, such as financial aid, are easy to under-
stand); reminders (e.g. timely reminders that bills or appointments are due); per-
sonalisation (e.g. a message that targets some personal characteristic of the user); 
framing and timing (e.g., by sending reminders and messages at a time when peo-
ple are likely to be paying attention); uses of social norms (e.g., disclosure of how 
one’s energy use compares to that of one’s neighbors); and precommitment strate-
gies (e.g. questions where people agree, in advance, to some course of action). How-
ever, despite the popularity and interest in nudges in general, there has been com-
paratively little attention paid to digital nudges in particular (see Mirsch et al. 2017; 
Weinmann et al. 2016 for two recent exceptions, and Yeung 2017 for a more general 
discussion).
Some digital nudges are simply online implementations of their physical counter-
parts, and do no more than reflect the intentions of their designers (Weinmann et al. 
2016). However, others are refined by an ISA through relevance feedback, and adapt 
to different models of individual users. One particular adaptive nudge, which has 
grown in commercial popularity, is the use of psychometrics to infer (from behav-
ioural signals) the personality traits of users, and to use this knowledge to design tai-
lored content (Matz and Netzer 2017). The popularity of this nudge is due, in part, 
16 More specifically, ‘nudges’ are defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid” (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008, p. 8).
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to empirical evidence that suggests interventions (e.g. messages or advertisements) 
are particularly effective when adaptively tailored to people’s unique psychological 
characteristics and motivations (Cialdini 2009; Matz et al. 2017).
A series of studies conducted online with 3.5 million individuals (Matz et  al. 
2017), investigated whether tailoring the content of persuasive messages (e.g. adver-
tisements) to individuals’ psychological characteristics significantly altered their 
behavior. The authors found that messages tailored to an individual’s level of extra-
version or openness-to-experience (two common personality traits) resulted in “up 
to 40% more clicks [measured by CTR] and up to 50% more purchases [measured by 
conversion rate] than their mismatching or unpersonalized counterparts” (Matz et al. 
2017, p. 1). This is clear evidence of how a technique that is readily deployable by 
ISAs can significantly control a human user’s behaviour.17
Adaptive nudging can also be used to help user’s achieve their own goals. Con-
sider the increased use of wearable technology for health and wellbeing. Many of 
these devices are designed to be worn 24/7, are equipped with a variety of sensors 
(e.g. accelerometers, bioimpedance sensors, and temperature sensors), and have 
access to huge streams of behavioural data. Such devices can make use of adap-
tive nudges that require timely delivery—a well-studied influence strategy (Cialdini 
2009).18 Alternatively, an ISA may use player profiling in video games (i.e. con-
structing a model of the player’s behaviour) to predict a player’s actions (Bakkes 
et al. 2012), and then adapt the gameplay by nudging a player towards a particular 
goal (e.g. improving skills within the game), and trying to improve the overall user 
experience (Yannakakis and Hallam 2007).
With the rise in machine learning algorithms, these techniques can also be of 
wider benefit to technology designers. For example, some companies can compile 
vast datasets, consisting of millions of user’s behaviours, and learn how to improve 
their systems by conducting mass experimentation (Maher 2016). However, app 
developers can also use this feedback to monitor a user’s attention and engagement 
within a game, in order to adjust elements of the game’s mechanics just before they 
lose interest and quit the app—likely as a means of increasing exposure to pay-to-
play elements that are the basis of many app developers’ business models (Byrnes 
2015). Nudges that encourage excessive consumption of online entertainment need 
to be carefully studied, particularly if aimed at children or users’ prone to addictive 
behaviours (see Sect. 4.4.2).
The above examples are only a small sample of the digital nudges that are being 
tested and deployed online. Some are benign, but others raise ethical concerns that 
need further investigation. On this point, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) note that some 
17 However, it is worth noting that most companies do not currently use such fine-grained approaches, 
and instead favour nudges such as the default rule to recommend one version of a product over another 
(e.g. Amazon favouring the Kindle version over a paperback).
18 One such adaptive nudge, uses a fitness tracker to monitor an individual’s physical activity, and deter-
mine the best time to notify a user about a previously made commitment (precommitment nudge) to 
improving their sleep patterns (e.g. a notification stating, “It’s almost time for bed. Getting ready now 
will help you get in bed by your bedtime of 11:15  pm” is displayed at a personalised time) (Kwong 
2015).
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type of choice architecture is unavoidable—one must always frame a decision prob-
lem in some manner, and in so doing, nudge users. The same applies to ISAs, some 
of which are able to alter the architecture to suit their goals (Hauser et al. 2009). If a 
choice architecture is always present, then it is unavoidable that an ISA is nudging a 
user in some way to better obtain its goals.
When an ISA has the capability to control aspects of a choice architecture, and 
learn which ones lead to increased reward, this may lead to the emergence of a posi-
tive feedback loop, which promotes not the most relevant offers for the user, but 
rather the most compelling—this scenario is in need of investigation.19 In Sect. 5.2 
we will discuss some of the ethical and philosophical issues in respect of nudg-
ing, and its possible impact on user autonomy. Some have proposed using nudges 
to bypass the reactive system that most nudges often target, and instead raise the 
probability that a user will decide in a more deliberative and rational manner (Levy 
2017). As an example, we can imagine a nudge that stops a user from sharing a par-
ticularly emotional piece of news, encouraging them to decide if they trust it enough 
to endorse it; or another nudge that helps a user not to send an email hastily worded 
with strong language, encouraging the user to take some time to reflect on the likely 
consequences.
The next section considers the worrying possibility of unintended long-term 
changes in the user’s behaviour due to prolonged exposure to an ISA.
4.4  Second‑Order Effects
There are ways in which a human user’s behaviour may be influenced as an unin-
tended result of interacting with an ISA. While the ISA might be rewarded only for 
influencing immediate actions, a side effect of this interaction might result in long-
term changes to either the beliefs or the utilities of the user, which in turn will influ-
ence future decisions as they combine to form the user’s value function. We call 
these ‘second-order effects’.
The second-order effects we discuss in our framework are general in nature, 
but we concentrate on specific examples for the purpose of illustration: changes to 
beliefs (e.g. increased polarisation of opinions); and changes in utility (e.g. possi-
ble cases of behavioural addiction, for example, to social media (Alter 2017; Lewis 
2017; Pandey 2017)).20 In making a recommendation to a user, an ISA does not 
only offer content or information about the world (e.g. news items), but simultane-
ously provides a potential reward to the user (the entertainment value associated 
with that offer). The human user—who is constantly learning and adapting—makes 
19 O’Neil (2016) has discussed some of the challenges that arise with the use of machine learning in 
society, and the possible emergence of feedback loops in areas such as business, education, politics, and 
policing. We consider this idea further in Sect. 4.4.
20 Milder examples may be found, but we concentrate on these two to emphasise the potential impor-
tance of this class of changes. Furthermore, while the examples are in the domain of recommendation of 
information and media, it is possible that second-order effects may also result from other interfaces, such 
as fitness assistants or video games (World Health Organisation 2017).
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use of the information to shape their beliefs about the world (e.g. what is the current 
opinion about a political candidate), while also being receptive to the reward, which 
can shape their future expectations (e.g. how to receive further rewards). Therefore, 
in recommending an item to a user, the ISA is indirectly shaping the user’s attitudes 
and expectations.
The ongoing changes in media consumption, increasing the time a user may inter-
act with an ISA, show the importance of this discussion. In 2017, PEW conducted a 
survey that found a majority (67%) of U.S. adults now access news on social media 
(up from 62% the previous year), and 20% do so often (Shearer and Gottfried 2017). 
In addition, a report by the UK Office of Communication (Ofcom 2017) found that, 
since 2015, adults are now less likely to go online via a computer (62 vs. 71% in 
2015), and are instead proportionally more likely to use a smartphone than a com-
puter to go online (66 vs. 62%).21
While repeated exposure to biased content can alter a user’s belief system [as is 
known in cultivation theory for the case of TV news (Potter 2014)], repeated expo-
sure to rewarding content can have the effect of stimulating reward-seeking behav-
iour, through a mechanism of reinforcement. As discussed in Sect. 4.4.2, this is con-
nected to the American Society of Addiction Medicine’s definition of behavioural 
addiction, which treats it as a biological deficit in the function of reward circuits 
in the brain, and characterised by prolonged exposure to addictive behaviours that 
enhance reward function (ASAM 2011).
In discussing both of these cases the following sections make use of the concepts 
of positive and negative feedback loops. Negative feedback diminishes the impact of 
some input to the system, while positive feedback increases its impact. When a trad-
ing ISA satisfies the user’s particular needs (e.g. booking a holiday), we can expect 
the interaction to come to an end—the need is diminished. However, if these needs 
are increased, then we can expect that interaction to continue or intensify. Without 
additional intervention, positive feedback loops may have destabilising effects on 
the human user, or the wider socio-technical system of which they are a part. Con-
sider the following examples of self-reinforcing behaviour:
1. Say the political beliefs of a user determine which articles they choose to read, 
and this triggers the RS to recommend more of the same. If the user adapts their 
beliefs to the new diet of content (which is now perhaps more extreme) then 
they end up clicking on more extreme articles as the ISA attempts to updates its 
model about what the user likes, starting a positive feedback loop that might lead 
to polarisation of opinion. This effect has been studied under the label of ‘filter 
bubbles’ (Pariser 2011).
2. If a user experiences a pleasing reward every time they discover a specific type 
of content in a video website or a social network, they may be more likely to visit 
the site again and click on similar types of rewarding content. This teaches the 
21 A proportion of the above findings were gathered using surveys, which could mean that the figures are 
in fact lower than they should be, as demonstrated by Andrews et al. (2015), who found that self-reported 
usage of smartphones is often far lower than actual usage.
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RS how to reward the user, and in turn closes the feedback loop, perhaps leading 
to increased usage and maybe addiction.
Notice that whereas positive feedback can have these destabilising effects, the 
appropriate use of negative feedback could mitigate them, as discussed in Sect. 5.4.
4.4.1  Changes to Beliefs
Changes to a user’s beliefs could occur indirectly as an ISA refines its model 
about a particular user or group. Through positive feedback loops, the recom-
mended items become increasingly more biased, as the ISA gets better at pre-
dicting the user’s goals, and subsequently shows the user more of the same. 
This effectively insulates the user from an otherwise diverse range of options 
that exist, leading to the emergence of filter bubbles or echo chambers (Pariser 
2011)—phenomena particularly prevalent online due to user segmentation and 
relevance feedback. A research team working with Facebook noted the following:
This changing environment has led to speculation around the creation of 
“echo chambers” (in which individuals are exposed only to information 
from like-minded individuals) and “filter bubbles” (in which content is 
selected by algorithms according to a viewer’s previous behaviors), which 
are devoid of attitude-challenging content. (Bakshy et al. 2015, p. 1130)
As users provide relevance feedback to the ISA, it is used to refine an ISA’s 
model and shape the future recommendations, which become increasingly biased, 
further altering the future content that is recommended to a user. For example, the 
aforementioned study noted that Facebook’s Newsfeed algorithm slightly reduces 
the amount of “cross-cutting content” a user is otherwise exposed to from their 
social network (Bakshy et al. 2015), while also noting that the composition of a 
user’s own network is the biggest limiting factor in the type of content they are 
exposed to, and that “the power to expose oneself to perspectives from the other 
side in social media lies first and foremost with individuals” (Bakshy et al. 2015, 
p. 1132). This homophilic tendency, inherent in social media networks, requires 
further exploration, in order to determine the impact that certain mechanisms 
have on limiting exposure to content.
When interacting with ISAs, the information a user is exposed to is (of neces-
sity) not a representative sample of the full range of content (e.g. beliefs and 
opinions expressed in news articles), but rather a representation of what the ISA 
expects will elicit the most clicks based on prior behaviour. In spite of this, users 
still process the recommended content as if it were representative, leading to a 
bias in their own model of the world. Lewandowsky et  al. (2012) discuss how 
selective exposure to content is exacerbated by the way individuals evaluate 
information, due to various cognitive biases. They note:
the acceptance of information as true is favored by tacit norms of every-
day conversational conduct: Information relayed in conversation comes 
with a “guarantee of relevance”, and listeners proceed on the assumption 
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that speakers try to be truthful, relevant, and clear, unless evidence to the 
contrary calls this default into question. Some research has even suggested 
that to comprehend a statement, people must at least temporarily accept it 
as true. On this view, belief is an inevitable consequence of—or, indeed, 
precursor to—comprehension. (Lewandowsky et al. 2012, pp. 111–112, ref-
erences omitted)
This is suggestive of the way users adapt their beliefs based on what they read, 
perhaps mistakenly assuming that some opinion represents the consensus view on a 
topic merely because of a lack of exposure to competing views. Lewandowsky et al. 
also outline how information is typically evaluated based on a) its compatibility with 
other things an individual believes to be true, b) the internal coherence of the infor-
mation (e.g. does the information provide a consistent narrative), c) the credibility 
of the source, and d) whether other people believe it (see Lewandowsky et al. 2012, 
for further details). Many of these biases act as heuristics, allowing us to evaluate 
information and make decisions on the basis of incomplete evidence, under time 
pressures, and in an adaptive manner (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). However, the same 
mechanisms could also play a significant role in amplifying the effects of biased 
content online.
Many RSs aggregate content from around the web, sometimes with no considera-
tion of its source or editorial process, making the types of cognitive biases discussed 
here particularly problematic as more and more content moves away from traditional 
gatekeepers towards algorithmically-regulated editorial standards.
Finally, the same technologies that we’ve discussed in this subsection are now 
being deployed by groups trying to influence people’s voting behaviour (Cadwal-
ladr 2017a), and may be contributing to increased political polarisation (Boxell et al. 
2017; Flaxman et al. 2016). Section 5.3 discusses this further.
4.4.2  Changes to Utilities
The possibility for users to develop a behavioural addiction to technology and social 
media is beginning to be explored (e.g. Alter 2017; Eyal 2014).22 One reason for 
the recent interest is that the designers of the relevant technologies have themselves 
begun to raise warnings about their use (Lewis 2017). The ex-president of Facebook 
recently made the following statement: 
The thought process that went into building these applications […] was all 
about how do we consume as much of your time and conscious attention as 
possible, and that means that we needed to sort of give you a little dopamine 
hit every once in a while, because someone liked or commented on a photo or 
a post or whatever, and that’s going to get you to contribute more content […] 
It’s a social validation feedback loop […] It’s exactly the sort of thing a hacker 
22 Unfortunately, to date, there is insufficient research that attempts to ascertain to what extent the above 
concerns are empirically supported (though see Ward et al. 2017 for an initial study).
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like myself would come up with because you’re exploiting a vulnerability in 
human psychology. (Pandey 2017, emphasis added)
In addition, the World Health Organisation (2017) recently announced that 
‘gaming disorder’—another area where users routinely interact with ISAs (see 
Sect. 4.3)—is to be included in their 11th Revision of the International Classifica-
tion of Diseases (ICD-11). Hence, we discuss this possibility here, as an impor-
tant direction for further investigation, and as a further example of a second-order 
effect.23
In 2011, addiction was defined, by the American Society of Addiction Medicine, 
as a “primary, chronic disease of brain reward, motivation, memory and related cir-
cuitry” (ASAM 2011). Although the ASAM note that numerous factors are involved, 
emphasis is placed on “an underlying biological deficit in the function of reward 
circuits” in the brain, such that prolonged exposure to addictive behaviours that 
enhance reward function are “preferred and sought as reinforcers”. This, in turn, 
can cause “neuroadaptation in motivational circuitry leading to impaired control” in 
future engagement with the addictive behaviours (ASAM 2011, emphasis added). 
This is important to note, given the way that the designers of the relevant technology 
frame their discussion by reference to neurotransmitters such as dopamine, a neu-
rotransmitter that plays a fundamental role in reward related signalling in the brain, 
as well as the emphasis that is placed on positive feedback loops that reinforce the 
pursuit of rewarding stimuli (i.e. maximising subjective utility or reward).
It is important to note, however, that the reward circuits mentioned in the above 
definition, do not have to be viewed as inherently dysfunctional, to nevertheless be 
implicated in the generation of addictive behaviours. Consider Redish’s (2013, p. 
26) notion of a failure mode:
[…] we did not evolve μ-opioid receptors to take heroin; we evolved μ-opioid 
receptors so that we could recognise things in our lives that have value and 
thus give us pleasure. But heroin stimulates the μ-opioid receptors directly and 
produces feelings of euphoria. Heroin accesses a potential failure mode of our 
brains—it tricks us into feeling euphoria when we shouldn’t.
In a similar manner, we can frame the present discussion around whether interac-
tions with ISAs exploit failure modes in our decision-making and reward systems, 
which may result in prolonged exposure to personalised, adaptive rewards selected 
by an ISA, and the potential long-term consequence of a change to a user’s utility.
Certain elements of human–computer interfaces, which users interact with, target 
the same failure modes that are implicated in gambling addictions (Schüll 2012). 
Like in gambling, many ISAs offer variable rewards to the user. For example, this 
could be in the form of simple pull-to-refresh mechanisms on smartphones and 
23 As one anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed out, it is worth emphasising that approaches to addic-
tion differ between countries. For example, although the WHO recently announced that ‘gaming disor-
der’ would be added to the ICD-11, countries such as South Korea and Taiwan have long recognised the 
possibility of gaming addiction (see Hsu et al. 2009).
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tablets, which may or may not reveal a new notification upon release (Eyal 2014).24 
The prediction of a variable reward in humans involves the differential release of 
dopamine, which in turn indicates a rewarding option to the user.25 This may occur 
every time a user chooses to engage with an ISA, as the user does not know what 
options will be presented—their rewards are merely expected.
The increasing automation of reward administration (as identified by the earlier 
examples of trading and nudging), means it is not simply a matter of asking whether 
these elements have been designed, but also whether failure modes could be impli-
cated through repeated interactions with an ISA. At present, there is insufficient evi-
dence to settle the matter, and most studies are restricted to a limited domain of 
the cases we are interested in here.26 Nevertheless, when considered alongside the 
discussion in changing patterns of attention and media consumption, it should be 
clear why further research is important. If changes to a user’s utility and changes to 
beliefs can emerge as a second-order effect, and also constitute a positive feedback 
loop with self-reinforcing dynamics, then it is imperative that we fully understand 
the individual and social consequences of interacting with these technologies.
As an ISA cannot directly observe the beliefs and utilities of the human user, it 
can only infer them based on the user’s observed behaviours (e.g. digital footprints). 
Furthermore, it will not be able to determine if it is learning to satisfy the wants and 
needs of the user, or rather learning about potential weaknesses and vulnerabilities. 
Rather, the best it can do is to try to align its value function with that of the user. In 
the next section, we will discuss a noteworthy proposal, put forward by Stuart Rus-
sell’s group (Hadfield-Menell et al. 2016, 2017), to attempt to solve this value align-
ment problem (i.e. how to ensure that autonomous decision-making systems maxim-
ise a reward function that is aligned with our values, see Bostrom 2016). However, 
as the user is guided by multiple decision-making systems (Sect. 4.3), it is not clear 
26 For example, Hormes et  al. (2014) tested whether there was evidence for disordered online social 
networking use by examining Facebook usage and its relation to increased alcohol usage or substance 
dependence. Although they reported positive findings in support of the claim that social media use can 
be potentially addictive, their study used a modified criterion for substance dependence, which was also 
exacerbated by the selective demographic group (i.e. college students). Multiple reviews also conclude 
that there is not sufficient support to conclusively state that excessive use of social media sites could 
result in behavioural addiction (Carbonell and Panova 2017; Ryan et al. 2014), and that due to the multi-
dimensional nature of social media use, there is an urgent need for more specific studies into individual 
factors that could be indicative of addictive behaviours (Frost and Rickwood 2017).
24 There are also other design examples that are also worth investigation (e.g. red notification badges 
mimic trigger warnings; auto-play features remove need for autonomous decision-making).
25 In the behavioural sciences, rewards are defined as “objects or events that generate approach and con-
summatory behaviour, produce learning of such behaviour, represent positive outcomes of economic 
decisions, and may engage positive emotions.” (Schultz 2009). The systems responsible for generat-
ing action selection in humans work by predicting these rewards on the basis of learned behaviour (i.e. 
reinforcement learning). More specifically, midbrain dopaminergic neurons encode what is known as 
“reward-prediction error” (i.e. the difference between an expected reward and the experienced reward), 
and have been said to play the same role as the error function in temporal difference learning algorithms 
(Schultz et al. 1997). This is important because we are here interested in the question of whether an ISA 
is capable of reinforcing a user’s behaviour through repeated exposure to selective rewards that the user 
expects will satisfy their own goals, and which in the long run may lead to the alteration of the user’s 
reward systems, and thus their utility function.
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at all with which of them the ISA will end up aligning. The actions of a user might 
not reflect their real goals or intentions, but rather their weaknesses; the user may 
not even be aware of what their goals are; and more problematically, may not even 
have what can be described as a “real goal or intention”. The next section discusses 
some of these consequences.
5  Discussion
The technologies explored in this paper have the aim of steering human user behav-
iour towards specific goals (e.g. time spent on site), and this goal-driven behaviour 
has been previously discussed (Cristianini 2010). Any technology that has the poten-
tial to steer people’s behaviour should be carefully analysed and regulated (e.g. phar-
maceuticals, publishing, education), to ensure it is not being misused, or leading to 
undesirable outcomes. For example, nudging may induce customers to make impul-
sive decisions in certain circumstances by targeting well-known cognitive biases (as 
discussed in Sect.  4.3). Although there are often rules that provide protection for 
consumer purchases, there are also many exemptions for online purchases that could 
still cause tension if induced through the types of nudging we have discussed (e.g. 
package holidays, travel tickets).27 On the face of it, the aim of a technology may not 
be harmful (e.g. nudging a user towards exercising, as opposed to remaining seden-
tary), but may nevertheless create tension with existing social norms. Furthermore, 
as we have demonstrated, second-order effects may arise, which were unintended by 
the designers, but nevertheless lead to undesirable outcomes (Sect. 4.4).
An obvious problem is that the positive and negative aspects of most technologies 
are difficult to separate. However, developing the right language and distinctions is 
often an important step towards understanding the major challenges, and developing 
effective regulation. The framework of this paper is intended to help researchers and 
policymakers understand how the different types of effects deserve different types 
of attention. Remedies may include new technologies, new business models, new 
laws, and possibly education. In this section, we describe and discuss some of the 
outstanding philosophical, ethical, legal, and social challenges that have been intro-
duced in the previous sections.
5.1  Value Alignment
As people are unable to converse with ISAs using the rich (albeit often impre-
cise) medium of spoken language, they are currently required to interact with them 
through relevance feedback (Sect. 4.1)—often determined by the technical require-
ments of the companies operating the ISA. Many of the companies operating the 
most popular ISAs currently in use today are based on advertising revenue mod-
els (often to supplement the lack of upfront user fees), and thus benefit from high 
27 In the UK, these exemptions are detailed under rules for online and distance selling, some of which 
were revised following the introduction of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (e.g. digital content).
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levels of traffic and automation to improve user models. This creates incentives for 
the ISA to be designed to focus on increasing CTRs, not necessarily user utility—
though as aforementioned, modelling a user’s utility is still an option. This means 
that whether some type of relevance feedback is incorporated into an ISA’s model, 
depends primarily on its ability to increase predictive accuracy—often determined 
using statistical techniques that fall within the area of predictive analytics. Many 
businesses experiment with monitoring a wide variety of implicit signals, including 
eye-tracking studies (Nielsen Group 2017), and keystrokes and mouse movements 
(Englehardt 2017). In some cases, companies can also link vast datasets of online 
behaviour with offline records that can be purchased from data brokers (Federal 
Trade Commission 2014), to further supplement the information acquired from rel-
evance feedback.
One of the motivations behind the vast collection of digital traces is based on 
an assumption of rational choice theory: the logic of an individual’s preferences is 
revealed through their overt choice behaviours (Samuelson 1938), and can be used 
to construct a representation of their subjective utility function (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1944). From a practical point of view, the question of whether our past 
behaviour reveals our true intentions may not be relevant for an ISA, so long as it 
can be used to predict our future behaviour. However, this question is very important 
from a moral point of view. Consider the following two cases:
1) Time Well Spent (2017) and Moment.io (2017) have collected data that show how 
individuals regret their usage of social media. Those apps that we regret using 
the most, also appear to be those apps we spend most time on (e.g. Facebook was 
used for an average of 59 min a day, and 64% of users regret their use of the app).
2) In 2012, a simple experiment was performed (Hensinger et al. 2012), which 
collected data from six news outlets (including the BBC) about the most clicked-
on news articles appearing in their “Top Stories” sections. These articles were 
compared with less popular articles that had appeared in the same section on the 
same day. The machine learning algorithm only had access to the title and brief 
description of the contents, just like human users had when making their choice 
on what to click. By comparing popular-unpopular article pairs, a simple scoring 
function was inferred, which captured some information about how “appealing” 
an article looked.28 Then, for any given pair in a further dataset of 33 news outlets 
from US and UK, the algorithm could predict better than random which of the 
pair was most likely to be clicked on. The inferred scoring function was also used 
to rank the contents of the 33 news outlets, according to which outlet the BBC 
audience found most appealing, and found that the BBC audience ranked tabloid 
outlets such as the Daily Mirror, the Daily Mail, and then the Sun more highly 
than the BBC.
28 More specifically, it inferred the average preference structure for the group of users. The experiment 
could be repeated at an individual level, but access to the individual log files was restricted.
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These two examples raise some interesting questions. If user’s regret their usage 
of social media, why do they continue to use it so heavily, and if the inferred model 
of BBC audience scores tabloids higher than the BBC, why don’t those users just 
read the tabloids instead? Our review suggests that one possibility is that users are 
not really looking to spend so much time on social media, or go looking for tabloid-
style material, but cannot resist it when they see it—the ISAs are not learning what 
users really want, but rather what they cannot resist. Should ISAs have to respects 
user’s stated goals, rather than their revealed weaknesses?
This dilemma is not limited to social media or news; it is representative of a 
wider issue known as the ‘value alignment problem’. As Stuart Russell and his co-
authors explain:
For an autonomous system to be helpful to humans and to pose no unwar-
ranted risks, it needs to align its values with those of the humans in its environ-
ment in such a way that its actions contribute to the maximization of value for 
the humans. (Hadfield-Menell et al. 2016).
They describe how a negative side effect of an intelligent agent’s behaviour, may 
result from a misspecified reward, and interestingly describe this as “a failure mode 
of reward design where leaving out important aspects leads to poor behavior.” (Had-
field-Menell et al. 2017, p. 1, emphasis added). Their solution, known as “inverse 
reward design”, is to make the intelligent agent more uncertain about the user’s true 
reward function, which it is trying to estimate in order to constrain its own reward 
function. The intelligent agent does not wish to simply adopt the user’s reward func-
tion as its own, but its own reward function depends upon an accurate estimate of 
the user’s reward function, if the two are supposed to be aligned. Therefore, the 
intelligent agent has to estimate the user’s reward function by observing their behav-
iour, but should be cautious (i.e. higher uncertainty) when transferring the estimated 
function to new environments. Designing an intelligent agent with uncertainty about 
its own reward function is shown to make the intelligent agent more risk averse, 
specifically in domains where a proxy reward function learned in a training envi-
ronment fails to generalise to a novel environment, and in turn leads to undesirable 
behaviours.
While this is an interesting proposal worth exploring further, as noted above, 
human users decide differently according to which decision-making system is most 
involved in controlling their choice behaviour (Kahneman 2011).29 This raises the 
question of which of the two decision-making systems is being revealed by our 
choices, and which reward function an intelligent agent should align with: can 
an ISA separate a user’s real goals and intentions from their cognitive biases and 
29 In behavioural economics, this is closely related to the question of whether our preferences are 
revealed or constructed. As aforementioned, revealed preference theory suggests that people have pre-
existing preferences that can be revealed by getting them to overtly choose between different options (e.g. 
clicks on a list of recommended items). By contrast, and in line with the research on nudging (Ariely 
2008), preference construction suggests that “in many situations we do not really know what we prefer; 
we must construct our preferences as the situation arises.” (Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006, p. 1).
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weaknesses, simply on the basis of observed behaviour? And, would uncertainty be 
sufficient to allow the intelligent agent to act appropriately in these situations?
Since we are unable to read each other’s minds directly, we are forced to infer 
other’s value (e.g. expected utility function) on the basis of perceptual feedback and 
our own “mind-reading” abilities (Heyes and Frith 2014); ISAs are even more lim-
ited in the type of feedback of which they can make use. Acknowledging this limita-
tion is important to go beyond using ISAs merely to make practical decisions (e.g. 
maximising CTR), so that they respect our rights when doing so.30 There are dif-
ficult questions such as can ISAs be designed to pursue long-term user happiness, 
rather than short-term desires; could a healthier diet of information (e.g. news) be 
promoted to a user over lesser (clickbait) articles, or would this represent a form 
of coercion by the company involved in re-designing the RS; should different rec-
ommendations be based on the behaviour of users that is modelled as having an 
addiction, or shows signs of increasingly polarized beliefs; and is it acceptable to 
intervene on these users to possibly construct a different set of preferences and a 
healthier utility function that promotes individual wellbeing? Consider the scenario 
where an ISA is mediating between multiple users (e.g. ride-sharing platforms). In 
these cases, we can identify three separate value functions: the driver, the passenger, 
and the ISA. Since the driver and passenger have conflicting needs (they both want 
to maximise economic utility), it is clear here that the value-alignment approach put 
forward by Russell and his co-authors would not work, and the ISA would have to 
make a choice that favours one party at the expense of another.
These questions (and others) expose complex philosophical issues, which require 
careful consideration if ISAs are to be used to help humans achieve their potential 
and flourish—as suggested by a recent British Academy and Royal Society report 
(British Academy and Royal Society 2017). Many of them also connect to a related 
discussion of autonomy, to which we now turn.
5.2  Autonomy and Nudging
We have many intuitions, rules, and norms about the ethics of coercion, decep-
tion, and persuasion that existed prior to the development of ISAs, which help us to 
understand the ethics of nudging and its impact on autonomy.31 This section briefly 
30 By employing the notion of ‘rights’ we do not invoke a deontological approach to ethics, as opposed 
to a means-end form of moral reasoning or consequentialist account. Of course, the concept of ‘rights’ is 
complex and involves human rights, legal rights, natural rights, and/or group rights, each of which has 
been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature (see Wenar 2015 for a clear introduction). Our 
usage here is the same as the sense in which people are required to respect people’s rights when interact-
ing. It may be that a restrictive utilitarian perspective, well-suited to dealing with quantifiable properties 
such as CTR, and formalisable using the tools of decision theory, results in individuals overlooking addi-
tional and important moral principles (see Hansson 2010).
31 In discussing the ethics of nudges, Sunstein (2016) states that abstractions such as ‘autonomy’ and 
‘manipulation’ can create serious confusion, unless we “bring those abstractions into contact with con-
crete practices.” In line with this recommendation, we have sought in this paper to provide a concrete 
foundation for the subsequent discussion regarding autonomy.
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introduces some of the most important philosophical and ethical questions that arise 
in this domain.
There are many philosophical accounts of autonomy, which differ in terms of the 
criteria they emphasise as necessary for autonomous behaviour. Procedural accounts 
focus on the processes of psychological deliberation that lead to overt choice behav-
iour, and make use of internalist criteria such as coherence to argue that autonomy 
requires acting in line with some mental state (e.g. higher-order desire; Frankfurt 
1988). In contrast, substantive-relational32 accounts place emphasis on the genuine 
opportunities that agents have for acting, by considering their relation to external 
material and social environmental conditions (Mackenzie 2008).33 Despite these dif-
ferences in emphasis, there is also broad agreement that autonomy should be under-
stood as an ability to self-govern one’s behaviour. Therefore, exertion of control by 
an external agent (e.g. an ISA) can be seen as a constraint upon one’s ability to exer-
cise self-governance.
With respect to Frankfurt’s (1988) requirement of coherence between higher-
order and lower-order desires (as a necessary requirement for autonomy and self-
governance), Sect.  4.3 discusses how nudges target automatic decision-making 
processes, and operate by exploiting cognitive biases that tend to be automatic and 
operate below conscious awareness—they aim to bypass the deliberative processes 
by which an individual can reflect on whether their behaviour is in fact consistent 
with their higher-order desires. On the face of it, this appears to be in tension with a 
user’s autonomy and their right to be treated as a rational agent. Furthermore, unlike 
traditional offline nudges that target large groups of users (e.g. government nudges), 
an ISA that can learn about and profile a particular user, may also be able to learn 
about their individual susceptibility to particular nudges (i.e. their “need for cogni-
tion”) (Cacioppo et al. 1986). Therefore, even if a set of recommendations are made 
by an ISA operating as the choice architect, a nudge towards the ISA’s preferred out-
come (e.g. by use of default, priming, or framing), in effect reduces the probability 
that the user will select an alternative. This raises an important question: is a reduc-
tion in the probability of choosing some option, by bypassing deliberative processes 
through the use of nudges, always a reduction of autonomy? Consider the following 
quotation from Sunstein (2016), p. 16):
Some nudges actually promote autonomy by ensuring that choices are 
informed. Some nudges promote choice making, for those who want to choose, 
and others facilitate choice avoidance, for those who choose not to choose.
32 The term ‘relational”, is often employed to deny that autonomy requires self-sufficiency, and in so 
doing connects these accounts of autonomy to recent feminist ethics of care (Held 2006), in which an 
individual’s relationships of care and interdependence are held to be valuable and morally significant 
(Stoljar 2013). These critiques also helped develop related accounts, such as the capability approach in 
welfare economics (e.g. Sen 1999), by identifying the restrictive nature of individualistic accounts of 
autonomy (see Robeyns 2005 for a survey).
33 Owens and Cribb (2017) explore what both types of accounts have to say on the matter of wearable 
technology, that uses ISAs to promote healthy behaviours (e.g. fitness, eating, sleep).
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Here, Sunstein is acknowledging that some nudges can promote autonomy by 
providing a stimulus to actively participate in the choice process. These autonomy-
promoting strategies are sometimes referred to as “boosts” (Grüne-Yanoff and Her-
twig 2016), “debiasing strategies” (Jolls and Sunstein 2006), or “nudges-to-reason” 
(Levy 2017). For example, Levy (2017) argues that some nudges can be treated as a 
nudge to reason in the sense of reminding people to deliberate or spend more time 
evaluating their options—boosting their active deliberation. As such, some nudg-
ing is acceptable if it steers users towards an active, deliberate choice. For exam-
ple, the above strategies may also promote autonomy as conceived by substantive-
relational accounts, by nudging a user to consider options in their wider social and 
material environment (e.g. educational nudges) that they were previously unaware 
of. However, this depends on the type of nudge being used. For example, default 
rules appear to be differentiable from boosts on the basis of their educative capacity 
(Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig 2016). Whereas the latter try to help people by inform-
ing them, and treating them as rational agents, the former aim to cut users out of 
the decision-making process, and therefore rest on the assumption that the default 
option is an outcome that is in fact desired by the user.
As Sunstein (2016) notes, consideration of autonomy and nudges must be done 
with reference to specific cases to avoid confusion. Consider the following list of 
questions when evaluating how the use of a nudge impacts a user’s utility:
• Could the nudge promote autonomy and increase utility (e.g. user makes free 
informed choices and gets rewarded with higher utility)?
• Could the nudge restrict autonomy but increase utility (e.g. beneficial, paternal-
istic nudges such as default rules)?
• Could the nudge promote autonomy but decrease utility (e.g. ignoring valuable 
recommended options in order to browse full catalogue)?
• Could the nudge restrict autonomy and decrease utility (e.g. a coercive or decep-
tive nudge that does not provide a valuable outcome to the user)?
These questions, combined with an understanding of the variable efficacy of dif-
ferent nudges, highlights that an ISA can be considered only partially responsible 
for any behavioural change. Ultimately, there are weaknesses or failure modes in 
human minds, which can be hijacked. Nudges to reason could be useful in aiming to 
increase a user’s autonomy (i.e. ability to exercise self-governance), and may help 
to counteract the worst effects of cognitive biases. However, any attempt should be 
carefully scrutinised to avoid leading to unintended second-order effects.
5.3  Moral Agency
As mentioned above, Floridi and Sanders (2004) argue that our concept of ‘moral 
agents’ should be expanded to include artificial agents such as ISAs. They argue 
that an anthropocentric interpretation of moral agency, which holds that a moral 
agent must be human-based (i.e. either human, or at least reducible to an identifiable 
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aggregation of human beings, who remain the only morally responsible sources of 
action), hinders development of distributed morality and collective responsibility 
(e.g. corporate structures or sociotechnical systems). Although their account relies 
on a formal framework for justification, which is beyond the scope of this article to 
detail, their argument can be summarised as follows:
• If a software agent can act upon and be acted upon by the environment (e.g. a 
user); can change state (according to some rules); and can change its internal 
parameters (e.g. changing those rules), then the software will appear interactive, 
autonomous, and adaptive.
• These three criteria (i.e. ‘interactivity’, ‘autonomous behaviour’, and ‘adaptiv-
ity’), when specified at an appropriate level of abstraction,34 jointly characterise 
what it is to be an agent.
• A moral agent must be capable of performing morally qualifable actions (i.e. 
causing moral good or evil).
• Artificial agents, by virtue of their autonomous, interactive, and adaptive behav-
iour are also capable of performing morally qualifiable actions.
ISAs as described in this paper meet all these conditions. First, an ISA regis-
ters its interactions with the environment (e.g. monitoring and collecting data from 
users), operates autonomously (e.g. selecting actions via embedded recommender 
systems to maximise its utility), and is adaptive (e.g. using relevance feedback and 
learning algorithms to update its models). Secondly, acknowledging these character-
istics allows us to apportion the proper levels of accountability to corporate struc-
tures or sociotechnical systems that deploy ISAs (e.g. determining whether a fault 
was foreseeable prior to the ISA’s implementation). Thirdly and fourthly, ISAs make 
decisions (i.e. take actions), the effects of which are morally evaluable and quantifia-
ble. Floridi and Sanders (2004) restrict their account to arguing that artificial agents 
are morally accountable for their actions—meaning they can be subjected to vari-
ous forms of censure (e.g. ‘maintenance’, removal, or deletion), but do not exhibit 
the relevant characteristics that would allow us to label them as morally responsible 
(e.g. deserving of reward or punishment) (see Floridi and Sanders 2004, Sect. 4).
It is beyond the scope of this article to assess the Floridi and Sanders account 
fully. Against it, firstly, it is arguable that moral agents must also be morally 
responsible, and that the above conditions for moral agency would be satisfied by 
animals that are not normally considered either to be morally responsible or to be 
moral agents. Note also that for many moral patiency is necessary but not sufficient 
for moral agency, and while it is plausible that some if not all animals are moral 
patients, it is not that plausible that current ISAs are. Rejecting anthropocentrism 
and adopting an account of moral agency, according to which artificial agents could 
be moral agents if they met further conditions than those above, is compatible with 
34 What constitutes an “appropriate level of abstraction” is formally and systematically defined in Floridi 
and Sanders (2004, Sect. 2).
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denying that current ISAs are. Either way ISAs make decisions and influence people 
and their decisions in ways that are morally significant.
Another conclusion that can be drawn relates to the discussion in Sect. 5.2 (i.e. 
the relation between nudging and autonomy). If the restriction (or promotion) of 
autonomy is treated as a ‘morally relevant action’, with the potential to cause harm 
(or benefit) to a user, then an ISA or its designers should be held morally account-
able and subject to some appropriate form of censure. As an increasing number of 
institutions embed ISAs into central parts of their decision-making processes, pol-
icy-makers will need to revise their approach to regulation, and collective respon-
sibility. This may also require a change in public perception, for example, if it is 
decided that an ISA is to be held accountable (and subsequently censured), without 
any additional punitive measures being brought against the company operating it.
5.4  Social Impact
There are many ways that technology can impact society, both positive and nega-
tive. Section 4.4 discussed some possible consequences that may arise as a result of 
second-order effects (e.g. belief change and possible behavioural addiction). This 
section introduces the problem of increasing polarisation of political opinion as one 
example of possible impact on the public sphere. We also discuss the ethics of using 
negative feedback to mitigate the impact.
As we explained in Sect. 4.1, many RSs do not consider all aspects of the content 
they recommend (e.g. whether it is ‘true’ or ‘false’, or the credibility of the source). 
Rather, they select actions based on relevance feedback, and in accordance with 
their particular segmentation methods. As such, they replace the need for independ-
ent curators or editors, selecting options in a manner that may or may not be condu-
cive to social values such as truthfulness or diversity of opinion. While it is unavoid-
able to be selective when faced with vast quantities of information, it is not clear that 
the best way to do this is through the reinforcement of increasingly polarised beliefs 
and attitudes, which may emerge in filter bubbles (Pariser 2011).
Recent media coverage—and to a lesser extent, academic research (e.g. Lee et al. 
2018)—has begun to ask whether the fine-grained segmentation of users that ena-
bles personalised microtargeting (e.g. the use of psychometric profiling in election 
campaigning, see Grassegger and Krogerus 2017) could be contributing to increased 
political polarisation (Cadwalladr 2017a, 2017b; Kang et al. 2017). A recent study 
released by PEW, details the record increase in polarisation of political opinion 
in the US (Shearer and Gottfried 2017). However, explaining this increase, and 
attempting to determine how and whether technologies such as ISAs have contrib-
uted to its rise, is challenging. Some have suggested that the homophilic nature of 
social media networks plays a contributory role (Bakshy et al. 2015), whereas oth-
ers have suggested that a lack of “serendipity” in online information retrieval (i.e. 
a user’s decreased exposure to unexpected and pre-filtered information because of 
interactions with RSs) may also be playing a partial role (Sunstein 2017).
In terms of studies exploring these matters, Boxell et  al. (2017) found that 
the “growth in polarization in recent years is largest for the demographic groups 
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least likely to use the internet and social media”. Specifically, they found greater 
increases in polarisation for those older than 75 than for those aged 18–39. Although 
not conclusive—social media may still have a contributory role in increasing polari-
sation—their findings at the very least require additional explanation over and above 
the hypothesis that the internet is a primary driver of rising political polarization. In 
addition, Flaxman et al. (2016) examined the web-browsing histories for 50,000 US-
located users who regularly read online news. Their findings were also mixed:
We showed that articles found via social media or web-search engines are 
indeed associated with higher ideological segregation than those an individ-
ual reads by directly visiting news sites. However, we also found, somewhat 
counterintuitively, that these channels are associated with greater exposure 
to opposing perspectives. Finally, we showed that the vast majority of online 
news consumption mimicked traditional offline reading habits, with individ-
uals directly visiting the home pages of their favorite, typically mainstream, 
news outlets. We thus uncovered evidence for both sides of the debate, while 
also finding that the magnitude of the effects is relatively modest. (Flaxman 
et al. 2016, p. 318)
What is particularly interesting here is that the authors acknowledge how a user’s 
pre-existing behaviours may contribute to the phenomena (i.e. offline reading habits, 
or cognitive biases, being transposed to an online setting)—emerging as a result of a 
user’s interaction with an ISA.
Although the mechanisms behind the observed increases in political polarisa-
tion may be difficult to determine, and in need of further investigation, the increase 
itself should nevertheless cause concern for those who recognise the importance of 
diverse representation of ideas within the public sphere (Habermas 1991). Is there a 
way to mitigate the impact of increases polarisation?
Section 4.4 introduced the idea of positive feedback loops giving rise to second-
order effects. It is conceivable that we can mitigate the risk of these positive feed-
back loops by adding negative feedback—as is the case with trading (Sect.  4.2). 
Whereas positive feedback tends to lead to instability in a system, negative feed-
back returns a system to equilibrium. For example, to balance the polarising effect 
of insular media coverage, a RS could occasionally promote a diversity of opinions 
in a user’s news feed. Alternatively, the risk of behavioural addiction in vulnerable 
users could be mitigated by reducing the reward or limiting consumption. While 
these suggestions initially seem sensible some immediate challenges arise.
First, it is not clear how negative feedback could be implemented in a way that 
both promotes a user’s utility and their autonomy, as discussed in Sect.  5.2. For 
example, one suggestion discussed was to use educative nudges to increase a user’s 
exposure to alternative viewpoints or to nudge them into making more deliberative 
(as opposed to reflexive) choices (Levy 2017). Jolls and Sunstein (2006) have even 
proposed that the law may have some role to play in supporting the use of such 
nudges (or “debiasing strategies” as they call them). However, some have argued 
that these suggestions still fail to respect an individual’s autonomy by not treating 
them as if they are capable of rational deliberation (Keeling 2017)—a requirement 
 C. Burr et al.
1 3
of some accounts of morality that have roots in Kantian ethics (e.g. Korsgaard 
1996).
Secondly, there is the matter of whether negative feedback is (a) desirable, and (b) 
effective. Some users (or groups of users) may not view the requirement of negative 
feedback as desirable. For example, minority groups may have found the emergence 
of filter bubbles to be beneficial in some instances, providing online safe spaces 
where they are free to discuss opinions that are important to their identity without 
fear of criticism. While some may worry that insulating viewpoints from criticism 
could lead to a rise in identity politics, and a fragmentation of the public sphere, it 
is still not clear that widespread implementation of negative feedback mechanisms 
(e.g. promotion of alternative viewpoints) would be universally welcomed. In addi-
tion, there is psychological evidence that suggests exposure to alternative (correc-
tive) viewpoints (most notably in political domains) often has the adverse conse-
quence of reinforcing an individual’s pre-existing belief (Lewandowsky et al. 2012). 
This is known as the “backfire effect” (Nyhan and Reifler 2010), and although the 
scope of the problem is a contentious matter (Wood and Porter 2018), it nevertheless 
demands consideration in relation to these important issues.
Finally, and as already stated, many of the technologies discussed in this paper, 
have been designed by companies for the purpose of promoting or selling a prod-
uct (e.g. advertising, entertainment, news), and therefore, the effectiveness of the 
ISAs is closely tied to the revenue of the companies. As such, it is not clear that 
making the ISAs less effective (e.g. showing unrelated content) would be a desir-
able outcome for companies (given the current revenue model), and therefore may 
require regulation (or a different revenue model) to achieve the necessary changes. 
However, regulation of technology is a contentious area, with arguments being made 
both in favour of increased regulation (e.g. protection of personal data usage as with 
the EU GDPR), and against increased regulation (e.g. fears that further restrictions 
will limit technological development). Furthermore, there is the problem of value 
alignment, which it is not clear that regulation can sidestep. Even recent propos-
als such as algorithmic regulation (O’Reilly 2013) must provide an answer to the 
value alignment problem. For example, how can regulation be designed to deal with 
cases where an ISA, with its own value function, mediates between two trading 
human users with conflicting value functions (e.g. ride-sharing apps)? Should reg-
ulation that promotes social well-being over individual well-being be considered? 
Careful consideration should be given as to whether such a proposal would simply 
increase a user’s exposure to coercive ISAs, or could perhaps be implemented in a 
way that respects individual autonomy (e.g. trading) while also maximising social 
well-being.35
35 Here, again, we encounter complex ethical disagreements over how best to approach matters such as 
social wellbeing. The concept is integral to welfare economics and social welfare theory, which often 
presume a utilitarian perspective (e.g. Nussbaum and Sen 1993), but is also compatible with a virtue eth-
ics approach (Crisp 2017).
1 3
An Analysis of the Interaction Between Intelligent Software…
6  Conclusion
This paper presents a model of an autonomous agent that allows us to distinguish 
various types of control that actual ISAs can exert on users. The framework of 
this model allows different types of interaction (i.e. trading, nudging, coercion and 
deception) to be separated, and presents a unified narrative for discussion of e.g. 
polarisation, addiction, value alignment, autonomy, misuse of proxies for relevance 
feedback, and moral accountability, as well as other important ethical, psychological 
and social issues that arise from second-order effects. We propose our framework 
as a resource to better enable philosophers and scientists, policy-makers, and other 
interested parties, to engage with these issues with a shared conceptual basis. We 
also highlight the importance of framing the interactions between human users and 
ISAs as potentially generating positive feedback loops. We argue that the nature of 
the feedback commonly used by learning agents to update their models and subse-
quent decisions could steer the behaviour of human users away from what benefits 
them, and in a direction that can undermine autonomy and cause further disparity 
between actions and goals as exemplified by addictive and compulsive behaviour. 
ISAs can sometimes exploit and reinforce weaknesses in human beings. It may be 
possible to mitigate this by using negative feedback, but first, and in any case, the 
ethical concerns we have raised must be faced.
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